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I. INTRODUCTION
“This is our greatest fear, that, one day, a terrorist attack will succeed
because law enforcement could not gain immediate access to the
plaintext of an encrypted message . . . .”1

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) identified Zacarias
Moussaoui as a possible “last-minute” substitute and likely the twentieth
hijacker in the September 11 atrocity.2 After training at one of Osama bin
Laden’s terrorist camps in Afghanistan, Moussaoui moved to London a
year before the attack. Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, an al Qaeda member, flew to
London immediately before Moussaoui left for his mission.3 Al-Shibh, who
roomed in Germany with Mohamed Atta, the mastermind of the September
11 attacks, tried to obtain an American visa four times between May and
October but was denied each time.4 Needing a replacement, al-Shibh is
thought to have briefed his close friend, Moussaoui, of the situation.
Moussaoui is believed to have then traveled to the United States in alShibh’s place.5 Once in the United States, Moussaoui deposited $32,000 in
cash into a new bank account and began taking flying lessons in Norman,
Oklahoma.6 Later, Moussaoui received $14,000 from al-Shibh who also
had wired money to Marwan al-Shehhi,7 Atta’s nephew and the terrorist

1. Charles Barry Smith, Current U.S. Encryption Regulations: A Federal Law
Enforcement Perspective, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 16 (2000).
2. Chitra Ragavan, The Case of a ‘20th Hijacker’?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec.
24, 2001, at 20.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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who piloted United Airlines Flight 175 into the South Tower of the World
Trade Center.8
Given all this, it was not until Moussaoui moved to Minneapolis,
Minnesota, that warning bells started to ring. Moussaoui enrolled at the Pan
Am International Flight Academy in Minneapolis to be trained in flying the
bigger jumbo jets,9 specifically 747s.10 While training on simulators at the
flight school, he informed his instructors that “[h]e wanted to concentrate
only on the midair turns, not the takeoffs and landings.”11 The flight school
notified the FBI about this suspicious behavior, and that agency later
arrested Moussaoui for remaining in the United States on an expired visa.12
Although the FBI arrested Moussaoui, who otherwise might have
been a pilot in the September 11 attacks, authorities failed to detect the
other terrorists. The U.S. authorities failed to discover Mohamed Atta,
Waleed al-Shehri, Wail al-Shehri, Abdulaziz al-Omari, and Satam alSuqami, who flew American Airlines Flight 11 into the North Tower of the
World Trade Center.13 Similarly, they failed to detect Ahmed al-Ghamdi,
Marwan al-Shehhi, Fayez Ahmed, Mohald al-Shehri, and Hamza alGhamdi, who hijacked and aimed United Airlines Flight 175 into the South
Tower of the World Trade Center.14 Authorities never discovered terrorists
Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaq al-Hamzi, Hani Hanjour, Salem al-Hamzi, and
Majed Moqed, who directed American Airlines Flight 77 into the
Pentagon,15 or Saeed al-Ghamdi, Ziad al-Jarrah, Ahmed al-Nami, and
Ahmed al-Haznawi, who commandeered United Airlines Flight 93 that
crashed in Pennsylvania, but allegedly attempted to hit the White House.16
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, many Americans are asking
the same question: How could U.S. authorities and intelligence agencies
fail to detect the September 11 plot? With the exception of a few of the
terrorists, they were young and needed direction.17 They needed money to
carry out their missions and, most importantly, they needed intelligence to
help plan and coordinate that fateful day. Where were the communications

8. Search for the Missing Pieces, SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), Sept. 23, 2001, at
Features.
9. Susan Headden et al., The Banality of Evil, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 1, 2001,
at 25-26.
10. Evan Thomas et al., The Road to September 11, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 1, 2001, at 38.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Search for the Missing Pieces, supra note 8.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id.

VOORS FINAL

334

3/6/2003 11:20 AM

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55

between the leaders in Afghanistan and the terrorists here in the United
States? Where were the communications that would have signaled the
intelligence agencies that an attack on the United States was imminent?
Even now, a year and a half after the attack, the question of how the
terrorists communicated remains a mystery.18
Newspapers and magazines quickly pointed the finger, but many
could not conclude who was to blame.19 They have, however, noticed one
common thread that runs through many of the FBI reports from both before
and after the terrorist attacks on September 11—the Internet played a key
role in planning the terrorist attacks.20
This Note argues that although privacy and economic concerns have
ruled the encryption debate during the past decade, the move toward
increased privacy on the Internet and relaxed encryption regulation,
designed to promote electronic commerce (“e-commerce”), comes at the
expense of national security and the protection of Americans’ safety. Part II
of this Note provides background on encryption. In particular, Part II
explains encryption and details its use throughout history. Additionally,
Part II examines how businesses use encryption to secure their
communications and financial transactions on the Internet. This Section
also observes that this technology is employed by terrorist organizations to
accomplish the same goal: to send private communications. Part III details
the history of encryption regulation during the last decade and addresses
why the government has relaxed its stance even though encryption
ultimately poses such a threat. Part IV analyzes whether encryption
regulation will provide the intelligence community the tools to deal with
terrorists who are now technologically savvy, or whether regulation will
hurt the nation’s already wounded economy. Part V examines Magic
Lantern, cutting-edge technology developed by the FBI that effectively
incorporates the privacy benefits of encryption while still providing
Americans protection in this new era of terrorism. More specifically, Part V
will argue this new technology should be implemented because it balances
privacy and economic concerns with national security needs. Finally, Part
VI will conclude by proposing the adoption of the FBI’s new technology as
a way to protect privacy and economic concerns while ensuring national
security.

18. See generally Kevin Whitelaw, Unanswered Questions: There Are Still Big Gaps in
What Is Known About the 9/11 Plotters, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 9, 2002, at 28.
19. See generally Search for the Missing Pieces, supra note 8.
20. See Associated Press, Attacks Renew Encryption Debate (Sept. 24, 2001).
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II. HISTORY OF ENCRYPTION
“If all the personal computers in the world—260 million computers—
were put to work on a single [strongly encrypted] message, it would
still take an estimated 12 million times the age of the universe . . . to
break a single message . . . .”21

A.

What Is Encryption?

Encryption is a technique that changes a plaintext message from its
original form by replacing or rearranging the letters and numbers and
converting the message into an indecipherable form using a mathematical
algorithm and a key.22 The length of the encryption key is measured in bits
and determines the strength of the encryption program.23 For example, an
encryption key that is 40 bits in length yields 1 billion possible keys or
combinations, a key with 56 bits has 72 trillion, and a key that measures
128 bits produces a gazillion solutions.24
There are two types of encryption systems: private-key and publickey.25 Encryption systems began with private-key systems that use
algorithms and a symmetric key to encrypt and decrypt messages.26
Private-keys are less private because they run into a fundamental problem.
Since “the same key is used to both encrypt and decrypt the message,” the
key must be e-mailed to the receiver in order for the message to be
decrypted and read.27 Private-key encryption systems offer limited security
because encrypted messages can be read if a third party intercepts the key
when it is transmitted from the sender to the receiver.28 This flaw thwarted
early efforts for businesses and the public to use encryption effectively
and safely.29

21. Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act: Hearing on H.R. 695
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, 105th Cong. 45 (1997) (statement
of William P. Crowell, Deputy Director, National Security Agency).
22. J. Terrence Stender, Note, Too Many Secrets: Challenges to the Control of Strong
Crypto and the National Security Perspective, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 287, 294-95
(Winter 1998); see also Kurt M. Saunders, The Regulation of Internet Encryption
Technologies: Separating the Wheat from the Chaff, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 945, 947-48 (Spring 1999).
23. Marc S. Friedman, Some Observations on Encryption—Plain, Simple, and
Unencrypted, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 8 (2000).
24. Id.
25. Tricia E. Black, Note, Taking Account of the World An It Will Be: The Shifting
Course of U.S. Encryption Policy, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 289, 296 (2001).
26. See Stender, supra note 22, at 295.
27. Black, supra note 25, at 296.
28. Id.; see also Stender, supra note 22, at 295.
29. See Stender, supra note 22, at 295-96.
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The invention of public-key encryption in the mid-1970s solved the
weakness of private-key systems.30 Public-key encryption systems require
two asymmetrical keys: one used by the sender to encrypt (called a publickey) and another used by the receiver to decrypt (called a private-key).31
Although these keys are a matched set and “mathematically related,” it is
impossible to decrypt the message by accessing only the public-key
because the private-key decrypts the message.32 Thus, the receiver
publishes his public-key so that the sender may use it to encrypt the
message he wishes to send to the receiver.33 The second key, the privatekey, is held only by the receiver, who keeps it private so that only he may
decrypt the message.34 Therefore, the sender looks up the receiver’s
published public-key, encrypts the message utilizing the receiver’s publickey, and then sends the message to the receiver.35 The receiver then
decrypts the message by using his private-key, which only he can access.36
If the receiver wants to respond to the sender, he would complete the same
process in reverse.
Once a message is encrypted, it can be read one of two ways. First, as
mentioned above, the receiver can use a private-key to access and decrypt
the message. The second method, a “Brute Force Attack,” is far more
complex and occurs when a computer program attempts to use all possible
keys to crack the encryption code.37 In layman’s terms, this is the
equivalent of a man holding a key ring with millions of keys, trying each
key in the lock until he finds one that matches. This process devours
massive amounts of computer power and takes an inordinate amount of
time.38

30. Id. at 296.
31. Id. at 295.
32. See id. at 296.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Black, supra note 25, at 296.
36. Id.
37. Andres Rueda, The Implications of Strong Encryption Technology on Money
Laundering, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2001); Stender, supra note 22, at 287; Bernadette
Barnard, Leveraging Worldwide Encryption Standards Via U.S. Export Controls: The U.S.
Government’s Authority to “Safeguard” The Global Information Infrastructure, 1997
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 435.
38. Interview by Russell D. Hoffman with Phil Zimmerman, Author of PGP, WALE
Radio (Feb. 2, 1996), available at http://animatedsoftware.com/hightech/philspgp.htm.
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Background on Encryption

Although encryption may appear to be a modern phenomenon, it can
be traced back to 1900 B.C.39 Governments and militaries used
cryptography to keep their secrets safe.40 One of the earliest forms of
cryptography was developed and used by Julius Caesar to send his military
orders safely.41 The aptly named Caesar Cipher is a simple substitution
cipher and employs the use of two alphabets, one directly written above the
other.42 The bottom alphabet is moved to the right (or left) of the top
alphabet.43 The bottom letters then represent the letters in the top
alphabet.44 For example, if the bottom alphabet was shifted one letter to the
right an A would represent a B, a B would represent a C, and so on. Thus,
using this cipher text, the word PLANE would be enciphered QMBOF.
This message would be kept secret because only the sender and the
recipient of the message would know how to rearrange the letters to
convert the cipher text into plaintext. In addition, changing the code at
regular intervals can enhance the security of the messages.45
Since that time, cryptography has become more complex.46 During
World War I and World War II, encryption played an integral role and
helped secure victories for the United States.47 For example, in World War
II the “Purple” codes used by the Japanese and the “Ultra” codes used by
the Germans were thought to be “unbreakable.”48 The United States’ efforts
and advancements in cryptography helped crack the codes and were vital in
winning the war.49

39. History: The Origins of Encryption, available at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/class/
6k180_park/Student-Reports/rnation/History.htm.
40. Stender, supra note 22, at 289.
41. See Adam C. Bonin, Protecting Protection: First and Fifth Amendment Challenges
to Cryptography Regulation, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 495, 497 (1996).
42. Daniel Olson, Analysis of Criminal Codes and Ciphers, 2 FORENSIC SCI. COMM.,
(2000), available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/jan2000/olson.htm.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. See generally History: The Origins of Encryption, supra note 39; see also Black,
supra note 25, at 294.
47. See Stender, supra note 22, at 300; see also Joel C. Mandelman, Lest We Walk into
the Well: Guarding the Keys–Encrypting the Constitution: To Speak, Search, and Seize in
Cyberspace, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 227, 230 (1998).
48. Mandelman, supra note 47, at 230; see also Olson, supra note 42; Stender, supra
note 22, at 300.
49. See Mandelman, supra note 47, at 230.
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Recent Encryption Advancements

Recent advancements made encryption more available so its use was
no longer limited to military and government.50 In the mid-1970s, two
scientists from Stanford University invented public-key encryption.51 This
advancement allowed messages to be encrypted, sent, and decrypted
without e-mailing the sender’s private-key.52 As discussed infra, this
eliminated the threat that the private-key might be intercepted and
subsequently compromise the safety of later messages.53
In the early to mid-1980s, Phil Zimmerman developed software that
implemented the concept of public-key encryption and revolutionized the
world’s perception of encryption.54 Pretty Good Privacy (“PGP”), as the
software is called, was released in the early 1990s.55 The program extended
the use of encryption from major governments and militaries to ordinary
businesses and private citizens.56
Although PGP was a boon to many businesses and private
individuals, the United States government did not agree. In fact, the
government deemed encryption software vital to preserving national
security.57 The State Department classified it as a munition and listed it in
the Arms Export Control Act with other military weapons such as machine
guns, bombs, and missiles, thus prohibiting it from export without a
license.58 Aware of this, Zimmerman gave away PGP for free on the
Internet.59 The government, however, decided that providing PGP on the
Internet constituted an export.60 This decision prompted the U.S.
government to conduct a three-year investigation of Zimmerman for
violating the Arms Export Control Act.61 After a lengthy investigation,
however, Zimmerman was never prosecuted.62

50. See Stender, supra note 22, at 296.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text.
54. Interview by Russell D. Hoffman with Phil Zimmerman, Author of PGP, WALE
Radio (Feb. 2, 1996), available at http://animatedsoftware.com/hightech/philspgp.htm.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. See id.
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Use of Encryption by Business and the Service Industry

The use of encryption systems is no longer limited strictly to military
use. Businesses, hospitals, utilities, and communications companies use
encryption to protect their information from being compromised.63
Increasingly, businesses are utilizing the Internet and incorporating their
sales and marketing plans to include e-commerce.64 In fact, experts
predicted in 1998 that “[b]y 2002, the Internet may be used for more than
$300 billion worth of commerce between businesses.”65 To effectively
utilize e-commerce, businesses can guarantee the safety of their
communications by using encryption.66 Without such safety measures in
place, customers who conduct financial transactions or make credit card
purchases may fall prey to those who exploit such information.67 For
example, Amazon.com, one of the largest online retailers, uses encryption
to secure customers’ personal information and credit card numbers.68
Similarly, Ameritrade, one of the largest online stock trading companies,
uses encryption to ensure the security of its customers’ stock trades.69
Additionally, Web browsers, such as Internet Explorer and Netscape, use
encryption to secure their users’ credit card transactions.70
Hospitals also use encryption to ensure the privacy of patients’
records.71 In an effort to cut costs and increase access to information,
hospitals began storing medical records in their computers, thus allowing

63. See Black, supra note 25, at 294; see also Mandelman, supra note 47, at 236-37;
Saunders, supra note 22, at 945.
64. See generally Lynn Margherio et al., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, THE
EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY (1998), available at http://www.esa.doc.gov/508/esa/
TheEmergingDigitalEconomy.htm.
65. Id.
66. See Black, supra note 25, at 294.
67. See id.
68. Amazon.com, Credit Card Security, at http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/
browse/-/468494/ref=hp_hp_ct_4_3/103-5728187-0035819:
The Amazon.com Safe Shopping Guarantee protects you while you shop at
Amazon.com, so that you never have to worry about credit card safety. Period. . . .
It encrypts all of your personal information, including credit card number, name,
and address, so that it cannot be read as the information travels over the Internet.
Id.
69. Ameritrade.com Security Statement, at http://www.ameritrade.com/tell_me_more/
(last visited Oct. 5, 2002): “It is the policy of the Ameritrade Secure Trading System to
encrypt the transmission of all personal or financial Web-based information that is
transmitted between our site and your browser.” Id.
70. Carrie Kirby, New Encryption Laws for E-mail Unlikely, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 6, 2001,
at B1, available at 2001 WL 3416304.
71. See Paul Korzeniowski, VPNs Become Key Part of Enterprise Networks;
Technology Information, BUS. COMM. REV., Mar. 2000, at 28.
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them to be accessed by patients, doctors, and other health care personnel.72
St. Vincent Hospital, in Birmingham, Alabama, for example, recently
upgraded its encryption from 40 bits to 128 bits to ensure the privacy of its
patients’ medical records.73 Others in the medical field have followed suit.
For example, a medical practice in Palo Alto, California, electronically
stores patients’ medical records to give medical personnel easier access to
the records and to improve communication between doctors and nurses.74

E.

Use of Encryption by Terrorist Organizations

Although encryption is necessary for businesses’ success on the
Internet, it is also becoming a sinister tool for terrorist organizations to
keep their plans and communications secret.75 The FBI’s success in
detecting and preventing terrorist activities depends largely on its ability to
gather this type of intelligence.76 Thus, in the words of Louis Freeh, former
Director of the FBI: “[U]nbreakable encryption ultimately will devastate
our ability to fight crime and prevent terrorism. . . . [and] will allow drug
lords, spies, terrorists and even violent gangs to communicate . . . with
impunity.”77 Experts and the public as a whole are beginning to realize that
new technology revolutionizes legitimate businesses as well as terrorist
organizations. “The new terrorism is of a different genre. . . . It does not
consist of guerillas sheltering in the countryside making occasional
incursions into the cities, but. . . . makes use of air travel and the Internet. It
uses similar encryption algorithms to hide its internal communications.”78
The FBI estimates that more than 1,000 foreign nationals with
suspected terrorist ties currently live in the United States.79 Previous attacks
72. See id.
73. Id. at 32.
74. Rick Whiting, Patient-Privacy Issue Gets a Doctor’s Care, INFORMATIONWEEK,
Dec. 24, 2001, at 40.
75. Threat of Terrorism to the United States: Statement before the U.S. Senate Comms.
on Appropriations, Armed Servs., and Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. (2001)
[hereinafter Threat of Terrorism to the United States] (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director,
FBI), available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress01/freeh051001.htm.
76. Counterterrorism and Infrastructure Protection: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 106th Cong. 45 (1999) (statement of Louis J. Freeh,
Director, FBI).
77. The Impact of Encryption on Public Safety and Law Enforcement, Focusing on the
Security Needs of Business and Industry and the Use of Encryption by Organized Crime and
Terrorists: Hearing before the Senate Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov’t Info.,
Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 105th Cong. 43 (1997) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director,
FBI).
78. George Yeo, S’pore a Free Port but it Will Give No Quarter to Terrorism, THE
STRAITS TIMES (SINGAPORE), Oct. 12, 2001, at 26, available at LEXIS News Library.
79. Thomas et al., supra note 10, at 38.
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by Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda organization indicate that sleeper cells,
consisting of a number of al Qaeda followers, journey to the target country
to live until they are told when, where, and how to carry out their attacks.80
The terrorists responsible for the attack on the United States lived among
us for a year81 performing everyday activities including doing laundry,
working out, eating pizza, and shopping at local malls and grocery stores.82
One neighbor described them as “five good guys,”83 and others believed the
terrorists were “students from the university.” 84
In between these times of normal behavior, the terrorists also planned
for their upcoming attack. They enrolled in flight school and practiced their
piloting skills, which would be needed when the time came.85 They also
bought box cutters that were used to take the planes by force.86 In addition,
the “tech-savvy hijackers . . . appeared to use a web of electronic
connections to plan and communicate in relative anonymity.”87
One source called bin Laden’s group “the coming thing in the age of
modern terrorism.”88 The head of the U.S. National Security Agency
voiced his concern that al Qaeda’s growing use of the Internet and
encryption to hide communications has eluded even U.S. technology.89
George Tenet, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, told Congress
recently that al Qaeda is “the nation’s most immediate and serious
transnational threat.”90 U.S. officials report that “encryption has become the
everyday tool of Muslim extremists . . . . It’s become so fundamental to the
operations of these groups that bin Laden and other Muslim extremists are
teaching it at their camps in Afghanistan and Sudan.”91 Bin Laden’s
terrorist organization has advanced and become more sophisticated. The
organization relies on computers and advanced encryption techniques to

80. Id. at 40.
81. Edward T. Pound, Under Seige, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 24, 2001, at 10.
82. Headden et al., supra note 9, at 23.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 24.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. David Fallis and Ariana Eunjung Cha, Agents Following Suspects’ Lengthy
Electronic Trail; Web of Connections Used to Plan Attack, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2001, at
A24.
88. Peter Grier, A Terrorist Version of NATO?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 16,
2001, at 1.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Jack Kelley, Terror Groups Hide Behind Web Encryption, USA TODAY, Feb. 15,
2001, available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/2001-02-05-binladen.htm.
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communicate through encrypted e-mail.92 In addition, the al Qaeda network
employs “top-notch software engineers.”93 This new technology makes it
more difficult to gather intelligence and to expose bin Laden’s plans of
terror. Currently, bin Laden uses powerful encryption devices that are
commercially available and increasingly easy to obtain.94
Although the FBI investigation has not yet found any direct evidence
that encryption played a role in the September 11 attacks, there is
conclusive evidence that terrorists, including those in bin Laden’s al Qaeda
network, used encryption to encode phone communications and e-mails.95
The investigation of Ramzi Yousef, the terrorist who planned and directed
the 1993 attacks on the World Trade Center, uncovered that Yousef used
encryption in a plot to destroy eleven U.S. commercial airliners.96 In 1998,
Wadih El Hage, one of the terrorists suspected of bombing the U.S.
embassies in east Africa, sent encrypted e-mails to members of al Qaeda
before the bombings took place.97 In 1999, Khalil Deek used encryption to
plan bombings in Jordan.98 More recently, “[s]even months [before the
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon], a widely quoted
newspaper report had claimed that bin Laden’s followers were operating a
communications network based on encrypted messages concealed inside
pornographic pictures.”99
Bin Laden’s resume of terror also includes other attacks that evidence
the use of encryption:
• February 26, 1993: World Trade Center bombed; 6 killed and
more than 1,000 injured;100
• October 3, 1993: 18 American service men attacked and killed in
Somalia;101

92. Threat of Terrorism to the United States, supra note 75; Bob MacDonald, It’s All or
Nothing; No Half-Measures in Fight Against Terrorism, TORONTO SUN, Oct. 9, 2001, at S5.
93. Kirby, supra note 70.
94. J. William Gurley, From Wired to Wiretapped: Forget Privacy Rights. The Real
Problem with Government Net Snooping Is That it Won’t Work, FORTUNE, Oct. 15, 2001, at
214.
95. John Rendleman, Mixed Messages, INFORMATIONWEEK, Oct. 1, 2001, at 18.
96. Kelley, supra note 91; see Alison Mitchell & Todd S. Purdum, Ashcroft, Seeking
Broad Powers, Says Congress Must Act Quickly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at A1.
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• August 7, 1998: U.S. embassies bombed in Africa, 301 killed and
5000 injured;102
• October 12, 2000: U.S.S. Cole attacked while in Yemen, 17
killed, 39 injured;103
• September 11, 2001: World Trade Center and Pentagon attacked,
thousands killed and injured.104
Although the reports only allege encryption was used to plan
September 11, hard evidence proves the terrorists used the Internet to plan
their attacks.105 “FBI assistant director Ron Dick, head of the US National
Infrastructure Protection Centre, told reporters that the hijackers had used
the net, and ‘used it well.’”106 In one instance, two of the hijackers
equipped with laptops would not check into a Hollywood, Florida, hotel
unless they had around-the-clock Internet access in their room.107 When the
terrorists learned that such access was not available, they became angry and
left.108 The terrorists also used the Internet to purchase “at least nine of
their [airline] tickets for the four doomed September 11 flights.”109 The
terrorists frequently used computers at public libraries to access the
Internet110 and used the Web to steal social security numbers and obtain
fake drivers’ licenses.111

III. ENCRYPTION REGULATION OVER THE LAST DECADE
The regulation of encryption has been a compromise between
protecting our national security by restricting access to encryption used
abroad, and recognizing businesses’ legitimate need for this technology
overseas. Early in our history, the U.S. government realized the important
role that encryption could play in keeping military communications
secret.112 To keep this technology firmly in American hands, the
government worked to place restrictions on encryption both domestically
and abroad.113
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A. The Struggle Between National Security and an Evolving
Global Economy
As the U.S. economy evolved and expanded overseas, it became
apparent that the use of encryption technology proved as vital to business
as it was to the military.114 As evidence of this, the government classified
encryption as a “dual-use” technology, meaning it had both military and
civilian use.115 This opened the door for businesses and average citizens to
use encryption to keep their information secret.116 The government,
however, restricted the types of encryption programs used overseas.117
The government’s policy, aimed at protecting national security, came
at the expense of our nation’s economy. Export regulations mandated that
encryption software sent abroad possess limited key length, thus
diminishing the strength of the program.118 Businesses that demanded
stronger encryption programs to protect their information had to submit to a
governmental review to obtain a license to export higher-strength
encryption programs.119 This policy left overseas American businesses with
the choice of using less than full strength software to protect their
information or subjecting themselves to a protracted governmental review
process. In addition, export restrictions left software companies that
produced encryption programs unable to compete with foreign software
companies that did not have to comply with the stringent U.S.
regulations.120

B.

Regulation of Encryption Through Export Restrictions

Before 1996, the State Department restricted the export of encryption
programs through the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration
Regulations (“EAR”), and the International Traffic in Arms Regulation
(“ITAR”).121 EAR allowed the export of products using only a general
license.122 The government’s classification of encryption software as a
munition, however, subjected it to tighter export regulations.123 Under
ITAR, a seller of encryption software needed separate licenses before
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exporting a munition. The applications for licenses required approval of the
Defense Department and the National Security Agency.124
On November 15, 1996, President Clinton issued an Executive Order
transferring the regulation of “dual-use” encryption from the State
Department to the Department of Commerce.125 This transfer of power
allowed the Department of Commerce to control the exportation of all
encryption technology that was not developed or used strictly for military
purposes.126 The shift of power from the Department of Defense to the
Department of Commerce benefited businesses that used or made
encryption software.127 This significantly decreased the amount of time
exporters waited for licenses to ship encryption products overseas.128 On
January 12, 2000, the Clinton administration continued to eradicate export
restrictions on encryption technology with the announcement that virtually
all types of encryption programs could be exported without restriction.129
The final blow to export restriction came in July 2000, with the
announcement that all U.S. companies could export, without a license, any
encryption products “to any end-user” in selected countries.130

C.

Attempts to Regulate Encryption Domestically

Although the United States primarily focused on the regulation of
encryption through export restrictions, its efforts briefly extended to
domestic regulation. In 1993, the Clinton administration implemented the
“Clipper Chip” initiative.131 Its purpose was to combat terrorists, drug
traffickers, and spies who used encryption to elude law enforcement.132 The
government planned to accomplish this bold goal by mandating that
encryption technology be subject to a mandatory “key escrow” program.133
The plan for the key escrow system required that a copy of the decryption
keys be held for safekeeping by a Trusted Third Party (“TTP”).134 The
Clipper Chip initiative was designed to allow businesses to use stronger

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Stender, supra note 22, at 303.
Black, supra note 25, at 299.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 300.
Saunders, supra note 22, at 950.
Id. at 951.
Black, supra note 25, at 301.

VOORS FINAL

346

3/6/2003 11:20 AM

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55

encryption systems, while ensuring that law enforcement could access the
keys should the need arise.135
Despite the government’s efforts to implement the Clipper Chip
initiative, the program ultimately failed. Many viewed the key escrow
system as one that would create an inferior product because it would not
grant the protection businesses demanded from the encryption software.136
The software industry, as well as the business community, argued that
mandating encryption software be accessible by a third party created a
“back door” through which one could access protected information.137
Businesses at home and abroad feared the government would abuse its
power to access the back door, thus obtaining confidential information
“under the guise of law enforcement and national security.”138 The Clinton
administration, unable to address these concerns and to satisfy those in the
computer and business industries, eventually abandoned the Clipper Chip
initiative.139

IV. THE EFFECT OF ENCRYPTION REGULATIONS: WOULD
REGULATIONS STOP TERRORISM OR HURT THE ECONOMY?
“Unfortunately, every time the United States has a lasting peace, it
becomes complacent about security and overly focused on economic
growth. History, however, has repeatedly admonished the United
States that such a mistake may have mortal ramifications.”140

With the terrorist attacks of September 11 fresh in our minds, many
are compelled to ask one question: If encryption regulations had been in
place, would the attacks still have occurred? In fact, two days after the
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, some in
Congress did more than ask the question.141 In a speech on the Senate floor,
Senator Judd Gregg renewed the previous call for regulations on encryption
products that had been resolved in recent years.142 Few of his colleagues
from either side of the aisle answered the Senator’s call to arms. The reason
for the silence in Congress was likely based on encryption’s previous
regulatory history.143 Specifically, many thought the regulations would
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cripple business and compromise individual privacy rather than prevent
terrorist attacks.144
Regulations that weakened the strength of encryption programs or
that mandated back doors jeopardized security on the Internet and had
major consequences on business as well as the economy. It is virtually
undisputed that strong encryption is essential for providing security on the
Internet. Faced with using altered encryption programs, businesses likely
would be hesitant to use the technology because they would be unable to
guarantee privacy for their customers. Without such security measures for
those passing confidential information online, e-commerce and other
industries dependent on encryption would suffer a crippling blow, dragging
our economy with it. This move would not only weaken encryption for
terrorists, but would also do the same to businesses and other industries
as well.145
Even if the government passed legislation that required mandatory
back doors so law enforcement could access suspicious encrypted e-mails,
other encryption programs without back doors are readily available.146
Programs such as PGP have been available online and are currently sold
without back doors. In addition, terrorists would not use encryption
programs if law enforcement held the keys and a back way into their
communications.147 Thus, even if previous regulations on encryption were
revived, many terrorist groups would buy encryption programs in other
countries without back doors to evade detection.148
More importantly, the investigation into the terrorist attacks on
September 11 revealed that encryption might have played a role.149
Evidence suggests that in addition to using encryption, bin Laden’s
organization also uses steganography.150 Steganography is a technique that
hides messages within pictures, music, and other media.151 For example,
after a plaintext message is encrypted, the message is hidden in a picture or
MP3 file using a steganography software file.152 The hidden and encrypted
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message would then be placed on a Web page and could be pulled up at
any time by others. This ingenious process would prevent intelligence
agencies from detecting that encrypted messages were being sent, not to
mention maximizing the security of the communications.
Thus, since previous regulations merely give the illusion of protection
against terrorism while potentially crippling the American economy, a
better solution must be ascertained. If restricting exportation, requiring
licensing, or keeping key escrow accounts will not stop terrorists from
secretly communicating through encrypted messages, then what will? Is
there an option government regulators have yet to discuss? The answer lies
in new FBI technology, that will allow the U.S. government to stare
through the proverbial keyhole instead of using a brute force attack to kick
down the door.

V. LEADING THE WAY WITH ITS MAGIC LANTERN: DOES NEW
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION SOLVE THE ENCRYPTION PROBLEM?
Finding a way to crack encryption has baffled law enforcement
agencies. Historically, if the government discovered a suspicious e-mail
that was encrypted and wanted to read it, it had two options—it could
obtain the private-key from the sender, or it could attempt to break the code
through a brute force attack.153 The first option, requiring terrorists to
supply the private-key, is not plausible because this would reveal the
investigation to the terrorists. In addition, those under investigation would
not want to incriminate themselves if they were engaged in illegal activity.
The second option, cracking the code by a brute force attack, is possible,
but the process involves a massive amount of computer power and an
equally large number of staff hours.154 Neither option is attractive.
Furthermore, law enforcement’s efforts may be for naught, since the
encrypted message could just as easily be directions to meet for a
basketball game as it could be instructions to carry out a terrorist attack.
What if, however, a third option existed?

153. See Rueda, supra note 37, at 23.
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(Spring 1998).
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What Is Magic Lantern and How Does It Work?

A new project developed by the FBI, code-named Magic Lantern, has
the capability of using the suspect’s own computer and unwittingly
employs the suspect himself to provide law enforcement its own private
encryption key.155 More specifically, Magic Lantern uses an existing
program that logs all of the user’s keystrokes and places them in a memory
application.156 This application enables the FBI to obtain access to the
suspect’s encrypted information by logging the suspect’s keystrokes as he
enters his password. The application then sends the password to the FBI at
a remote location.157 In essence, Magic Lantern allows the FBI to record a
suspect’s keystrokes and steal his private encryption key.158
Originally, software companies developed keystroke-logging software
for home use so parents could monitor their children’s activities on the
Internet.159 Soon after, some employers installed the keystroke-logging
software to monitor their employees’ computer habits while at work.160
After discovering that hackers used keystroke-logging software to steal
users’ passwords, the government realized how useful it could be to obtain
criminals’ private-keys.161 Thus, the government developed Magic Lantern.
Keystroke-logging software has advanced in recent years. Early
attempts required FBI agents to enter the suspect’s home or office where
the computer was located and place the device inside the keyboard.162
Recently, however, the FBI has combined new technology with the
keystroke-logging software to make it more versatile and effective.163 Now,
the FBI’s Magic Lantern program merges the old idea of keystroke-logging
with a Trojan Horse virus so that the information can be collected and
transmitted without ever having to enter the suspect’s home or
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business.164 The FBI can accomplish this task in one of two ways. The
easiest of the two begins by sending e-mail to the suspect’s e-mail
account.165 The message would likely resemble the junk e-mail we all
receive166 or could even be attached to a family member’s e-mail.167 Once
the suspect opens the message, the Trojan Horse virus, attached to the
message, installs itself onto the suspect’s computer, and begins logging the
suspect’s keystrokes.168 The second process involves law enforcement
exploiting flaws in the operating system to enter the computer to install the
program.169 In either case, the program would then record the keystrokes of
the suspect, including the password to his encryption program, and transmit
the information to the FBI while the suspect is online,170 possibly by email.171

B.

Magic Lantern Works: Case in Point

The federal government has successfully employed Magic Lantern
and used the information to convict a prominent mobster. Upon locating
the suspect, the FBI obtained a court order from a federal magistrate to
install the program.172 Using an older version of Magic Lantern, the FBI
entered the office of New Jersey mobster Nicodemo Scarfo and planted
keystroke loggers on all the office’s computers.173 By recording Scarfo’s
keystrokes, the FBI was able to obtain his encryption keys and decrypt files
that were later used in his prosecution for loan sharking and racketeering.174

C.

What Are the Implications of Magic Lantern?

Many of the regulations that govern this new technology are
contained in the U.S.A. Patriot Act.175 Under current law, law enforcement
agencies that want to infect a computer with this Trojan Horse virus must
164. Bob Port, Spy Software Helps FBI Crack Encrypted Mail, DAILY NEWS, Dec. 9,
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acquire a court order allowing them to place the program on a suspect’s
computer.176 Under the U.S.A. Patriot Act, however, only a state or U.S.
attorney general need approve the measure to begin the process, while a
court order can come later.
So far, Magic Lantern seems capable of curing many ills plaguing law
enforcement. First and foremost, Magic Lantern turns the task of
monitoring encrypted e-mail and other Internet traffic from a task that is
nearly impossible to one as easy as obtaining approval. Second, the Fourth
Amendment concerns raised by the FBI’s Carnivore system are diminished
because Magic Lantern is directed at specific computers or specific e-mails,
thus eliminating the need to cast the net too wide. These factors, when
coupled with a form of judicial oversight, will provide law enforcement
with the tools they need to investigate suspects while adhering to
constitutional guarantees.

D.

Magic Lantern: Shining a Light on a New Solution

The advent of the Internet has revolutionized the world. Through this
new medium we can check movie listings, look up new recipes, download
the latest music, and read newspapers written halfway around the world.
The Internet’s most profound effect, however, lies in the booming market
of e-commerce. Although the Internet contributed to record economic
growth in the 1990s, that success was based on businesses ensuring the
confidentiality of customers’ personal information. American businesses
accomplished this task domestically and overseas by using limited-strength
encryption programs and later, when the government abolished regulations
limiting the strength of encryption technology, stronger programs.
Although the abolition of encryption regulations proved necessary to
e-commerce and helped vault the economy to record levels, the move had
dire consequences on our national security. Businesses weren’t the only
organizations using encryption to keep communications from prying eyes.
Terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda, saw encryption as a vehicle to
keep its plans secret and to carry out its acts of terrorism undetected.
It appears now that we have come full circle. The government began
regulating encryption as munitions to ensure the technology would not fall
into the hands of our enemies. Slowly, it backed down and relaxed the
regulations to satisfy the needs of our evolving economy. As regulations
relaxed, our economy strengthened, and so did terrorists’ capabilities. Now
that terrorists have access to the technology, what can be done to regulate
it? The solution lies not in reviving old regulations, but in implementing
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new technologies. As technology evolves, so too must the government’s
response to the problems new technology creates.
The government has responded by creating Magic Lantern, a new
technology that protects business while ensuring the nation’s security. Not
only does Magic Lantern allow lax encryption regulation, but it also targets
only those individuals who the government has probable cause to suspect
of engaging in terrorist activities. It ensures privacy and protection for
businesses while giving terrorists a false sense of security. Further, Magic
Lantern should be governed by existing constitutional protections; thus,
there would not be a need for additional regulations. Magic Lantern solves
the problem of encryption regulation as it takes away the need to regulate
encryption altogether.

VI. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, many are struggling with the
thought that terrorism can strike at home as easily as it can abroad.
Terrorism is no longer carried out with grenades, Molotov cocktails, or
pipe bombs. The terrorists of today employ computers, the Internet, cell
phones, steganography, and encryption. Using this technology, terrorist
groups can carry out their plans in secret, while intelligence agencies are
left to conduct their investigations after the fact. Although the widespread
dissemination of encryption in the absence of government regulation may
affect national security, we still must examine the effects of governmental
regulation on businesses and individuals before reacting. E-commerce
powered by the Internet has helped drive the American economy to record
levels. Its success could not have been accomplished, however, if
customers’ personal and private information could not be protected online
by businesses. Past attempts at encryption regulation illustrate this is a
delicate balance—a balance which has recently shifted in favor of business.
While the business sector has won the battle, however, law enforcement is
still effectively fighting the war with the development of new technologies
that break the encryption barrier without raising the concerns of past
regulatory efforts.

